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1. Introduction  
 
Marcin Lewiński wonders here that while we all agree that we should be minimally bound by the 
principle of accurately representing the standpoints of our interlocutors (van Eemeren & 
Grootendoorst, 2004: 191), what happens when there are genuine semantic disagreements about 
what those standpoints are? Are all cases of semantic wrangling instances of straw manning? 
Indeed, from this point of view, the classical straw man—the one where you distort your 
interlocutor’s conclusion or premises—seems to be anti-dialectical: meanings are fixed, 
transparent, and perfect; to negotiate these meanings in a dialogue would be to sin against one of 
the most basic rules of argument. If I’ve got this right, it strikes me as a compelling and interesting 
thesis. It echoes other concerns in fallacy theory (Boudry, Paglieri & M. Pigliucci: 2015; Aikin, 
2017) that fallacy descriptions, especially the popular ones recommended to students, gluttonously 
devour everything on the table. There is certainly much to agree with here. However, at the risk of 
misrepresenting what Lewiński is up to, I want in this brief comment to ask what he means by 
straw man in the first place and offer two counter-considerations. 
 
 
2.  Two questions 
 
Lewiński is certainly right to explore the dialecticality of the straw man. As Tindale pointed out, 
it’s clearly the case that the straw man cannot be explained by reference to schemes alone (2007, 
p. 25). They’re just arguments, after all, and nothing is wrong with that. Lewiński’s exploration of 
the dialecticality of the straw man has an inward focus: it takes a deeper look at the features of the 
exchange rather than the broader features of the dialectical situation. There’s no denying the 
dialectical traps of the straw man—legitimate questions over the meanings of crucial terms can 
quickly derail into allegations of purposeful obtuseness or misrepresentation. Once that happens, 
discussion is over.  
 Let’s begin by considering the three conditions of being a fallacy: “a fallacy (i) is an 
argument, (ii) that is invalid, and (iii) appears to be valid” (Hansen, 2020). My interest here is the 
third of these—call it the deceptiveness feature. It seems, after all, one of our main concerns with 
fallacies is their treacherousness: i.e., they might sucker us and, importantly, no one wants to be a 
sucker. On this score, I’m somewhat skeptical that a dialectical account of the straw man such as 
the one Lewiński has produced here can be successful, as an account of the straw man, without 
reference to the other participants in the discussion—namely, the onlooking audience. One reason 
for this is that misrepresenting someone to their face is a very dubious dialectical strategy, 
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especially when we take the primary problem to be a representational one. After all, the common 
understanding of the representational straw man is a misrepresentation of someone’s premises, 
reasoning, or argument (Aikin & Casey, 2011). I once knew someone who did this, prefacing his 
reconstruction of others’ views with the phrase, “oh, I see what you’re saying” and then, 
unsurprisingly, not seeing what they were saying. What is maddening about this strategy is not 
really the representational question, even though this certainly involves that, but the aggravation 
of having to correct it.  
 The pragmatic limitations of this strategy, however, do point to some other fallacious 
strategies along the dialectical axis Lewiński is describing here. Assuming, for the sake of 
argument, a virtue-theoretic posture, we might say there is a kind of fallacy of excessive 
questioning or clarification seeking. For example, what distinguishes genuine interest in 
clarification from “sea-lioning,” the trollish tactic where one perpetually and disingenuously seeks 
more information in order to aggravate an interlocutor (Wikipedia, 2020)? Going the other 
direction, one might make one’s position so obscure, complex, or long that clarifying questions 
are just not possible, or maybe practical. Aristotle describes this scenario in the Topics:  
 
Moreover, formulate your proposition as though you did so not for its own sake, but in 
order to get at something else: for people are shy of granting what an opponent's case really 
requires. Speaking generally, a questioner should leave it as far as possible doubtful 
whether he wishes to secure an admission of his proposition or of its opposite: for if it be 
uncertain what their opponent's argument requires, people are more ready to say what they 
themselves think. (156b, p. 2-9) 
 
A variation on this strategy might be called “the self-straw man”: purposely offering weak and 
vague formulations of your own position in order to waste your interlocutors time or, what is more 
dastardly, to gin up grounds for accusing them of straw-manning you (for, say, their failure of 
charity). Sometimes people just call this trolling. In the end, what makes these strategies 
troublesome is not so much the representational question, which is the core of the straw man, but 
the economic one. At bottom, dialectical turns in argument come with costs. Taking up a turn 
correcting a misinterpretation is dialectically costly not only because you’ve used up time, but also 
because it uses up argumentative goodwill. In the Euthyphro, Socrates is genuinely interested in 
the meaning of the term piety, but the practical limitations of dialogical exchanges limit the amount 
of chances he gets not to get it. With this version of the straw man, the target is not likely to be 
deceived as much as they’re going to be aggravated, frustrated, and exasperated. In other words, 
the cases of two-person dialogical straw manning are not good candidates for the conception of 
the straw man where the distorted view replaces the original and is a reason to think it 
unacceptable. To put it more bluntly, it might be the case that the very legitimate worries Lewiński 
raises do not raise concerns about straw men in the first place. 
 Since I have been discussing the deceptiveness feature of straw men here, and claiming 
that the two-person version doesn’t account for it, I should say where I think that lies. Let me close 
out here by doing that. de Saussure (2018), among others (Schumann, Zufferey, & Oswald, 2019; 
Aikin & Talisse, 2019) point out that straw manning is best understood in terms of its effect on an 
onlooking audience. This makes it a three-termed relation: the straw manner, the victim (the person 
whose views are misrepresented), and the receptive audience (who is a kind of second victim). 
While the first victim of the straw man is unlikely to be swayed or deceived by the distorted version 
of their view, an onlooking audience might be. This works especially well when the victim is not 
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around to respond. This, as de Saussure points out, has the added benefit of making the straw 
manner look especially astute at argument criticism. As a consequence, the straw manned person 
not only has their view warped, but, more importantly, loses credibility in the eyes of the audience. 
The point, in other words, of the straw man is to close the discussion with the straw manned. 
They’re not up to argument, as is the straw manner, and so next time they roll around you’ll not 
waste your time with them (Aikin & Talisse, 2019; Aikin & Casey, 2011). In the end, the difference 
between the two-person and the three-person (for lack of a better descriptor) varieties is that in the 
second case, the misrepresentation serves as evidence of the straw manned person’s incompetence, 
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